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TORTS-AVIATION SAFETY RATINGS AS DEFAMATION:
AVIATION CHARTER, INC. V. AVIATION RESEARCH GROUP/US
LISA NORMAND*
N THE RECENT CASE of Aviation Charter, Inc. v. Aviation Re-
search Group/US,I the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit held that the First Amendment protected an aviation safety
rating published in a newspaper article because it was a subjec-
tive assessment incapable of being proved true or false. While a
state may choose to extend protection to the safety rating pub-
lished in this case, 2 the First Amendment does not require such
a result. The Eighth Circuit too narrowly construes the Su-
preme Court's holding that an opinion can imply a false asser-
tion of fact in the seminal case analyzing opinion as defamation,
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.3
Aviation Research Group/US ("ARGUS"), a private firm that
researches and publishes safety ratings of air charter service
providers, assigned Aviation Charter its lowest possible rating.'
After Senator Paul Wellstone and seven others died in an Avia-
tion Charter crash, the Minneapolis Star Tribune published an ar-
ticle referring to the poor safety rating and quoting ARGUS's
president.5 Aviation Charter sued ARGUS for defamation and
for violations of the Lanham Act and the Minnesota Deceptive
Trade Practices Act ("MDTPA"). 6
Aviation Charter claimed there were significant problems with
ARGUS's methodology.7 It contended that Mark Fisher, who
* J.D. Candidate, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law,
2007; B.A., University of North Texas, magna cum laude, 2002.
1 416 F.3d 864, 871 (8th Cir. 2005).
2 See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 15 (1990) (citing N.Y. Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).
- See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18-19.
4 Aviation Charter, 416 F.3d at 867.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 866.
7 Appellant's Brief and Addendum at 3, Aviation Charter, Inc. v. Aviation Re-
search Group/US, 416 F.3d 864 (8th Cir. 2005) (No. 04-3040).
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developed ARGUS's method for comparing safety of aviation
charter services, "had no formal education, training, or experi-
ence in the field of statistics" and "no formal education in the
field of aviation safety."" Fisher relied on accident and incident
reports in National Transportation Safety Board ("NTSB") and
Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") databases for calculat-
ing the safety ratings. 9 Dr. Luxhoj, the expert ARGUS hired to
analyze its formula, identified several problems with ARGUS's
scoring method.' 0
First, Dr. Luxhoj "provided ARGUS with scientific studies es-
tablishing that the databases ARGUS relied on were not
predictors of safety ... ."'I One reason for this is that the
databases include "incident reports," which do not necessarily
raise a safety issue. 12 That reports of "past incidents may actually
lead to a safer operator" and that the databases rely on self-re-
porting were other reasons Dr. Luxhoj gave for why the
databases do not sufficiently predict safety.13 Second, the raw
numbers of incident and accident reports were not "normal-
ized" before being used to calculate safety ratings. 4 Normaliza-
tion, the process by which raw numbers are converted into rates,
is required before comparisons can be made, since larger carri-
ers with more frequent flights are likely to have more incident
and accident reports.1 5 Third, Dr. Luxhoj concluded that
grouping carriers by size, as ARGUS did, is not statistically de-
fensible because there are significant variables within each
group.' 6 Finally, Dr. Luxhoj complained that ARGUS added the
scores derived from the two databases together to arrive at a to-
tal score without taking into account the frequency of records
from each database.1 7 This is significant because one database
covers less serious, more frequent records, while the other data
base covers more serious, less frequent records.18
8 Id. at 6.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 7.
1 Id.
12 Id. at 8-9.
13 Id. at 9.
14 Id. at 10.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 10-11.
17 Id. at 11.
18 Id.
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Aviation Charter claimed ARGUS disregarded Dr. Luxhoj's
findings and proceeded to publish the unfavorable rating.' To
bolster its claim that ARGUS's rating was erroneous, Aviation
Charter claimed an independent aviation safety auditor ranked
Aviation Charter as one of the best it had ever seen.2"
The U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota granted
ARGUS's summary judgment motion on the defamation claim
because it concluded that Aviation Charter had failed to estab-
lish a genuine issue of material fact that ARGUS acted with mal-
ice." The district court also held that the safety rating was "a
provably false factual connotation, and thus defamatory in na-
ture. '22 The district court relied on the U.S. Supreme Court's
holding in Milkovich, in which the Court refused to expand First
Amendment protection to include all opinion because "expres-
sions of opinions often embrace 'an assertion of objective
fact. '"23
In discussing its holding that the safety rating was, in fact, de-
famatory, the district court cited another case it had previously
decided.24 In Landers v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.,25 an
employee who was fired after receiving a poor performance rat-
ing sued his employer for defamation, breach of contract, and
disability discrimination. Regarding the defamation claim, the
employer argued that the rating could not be defamatory be-
cause it was not susceptible to being proved true or false.~z In
support of its argument, the employer relied on a Minnesota
Court of Appeals case, McGrath v. TCF Bank Savings, FSB, which
held that "a manager calling an employee a 'troublemaker' was
not defamatory because the phrase failed to suggest verifiably
false facts about the employee. ' 27 The district court in Landers
rejected the employer's argument because it found McGrath was
distinguishable: "While the term 'troublemaker' standing alone
I9 ld. at 12-13.
21 Id. at 3.
21 Aviation Charter, Inc., v. Aviation Research Group/US, No. 03-2439, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14132, at *14 (D. Minn. Jul. 10, 2004).
22 Id. at *11.
23 Id. at *8 (quoting Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18 (1990)).
24 Id. at *10-11.
25 No. 00-2233, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22023, at *1, 5-6 (D. Minn. Dec. 28,
2001).
26 Id. at *16 (noting the employer was "relying on the axiomatic distinction
between opinions and facts").
27 ]i. (referring to McGrath v. TCF Bank Sav., FSB, 502 N.W.2d 801, 808
(Minn. Ct. App. 1993)).
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might not have been sufficiently tethered to specific facts to con-
stitute defamation, the numerical ratings at issue in this case are
tied to particular facts about [the employee's] performance. "28
The Eighth Circuit upheld the district court's grant of sum-
mary judgment to ARGUS on the defamation claim, but on dif-
ferent grounds.29 The court never reached the issue of actual
malice."0 Instead, it concluded that the rating was not defama-
tory because it was not an "objectively verifiable fact," thereby
overruling the district court's conclusion that the rating was ca-
pable of being proved false.3
While Aviation Charter claimed seven statements in the Min-
neapolis Star Tribune article constituted defamation, the Eighth
Circuit focused on the comparison implicit in the safety rating
itself, explaining that the other statements were derivative of the
rating. 2 The comparison implicit in the rating was that "Avia-
tion Charter, relative to other carriers of its size, has an unfavor-
able safety record."33  The court explained that if the
comparison was not defamatory, then the statements derivative
of the rating were not defamatory. 4
The Eighth Circuit, like the district court, relied on Milkovich
in its holding.3 In Milkovich, a former high school wrestling
coach sued a newspaper for publishing an article that suggested
he lied under oath in a hearing regarding his team's involve-
ment in an altercation 6.3  The Court in Milkovich contrasted its
holding in Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S.
6 (1970), in which a newspaper published an article characteriz-
ing a real estate developer's negotiations with the city council as
"blackmail. ' 37 In that case, the Court held that "even the most
careless reader must have perceived that the word was no more
than rhetorical hyperbole" rather than an assertion that the de-
veloper had actually committed the crime of blackmail.3
28 Landers, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22023, at *16-17.
29 Aviation Charter, Inc. v. Aviation Research Group/US, 416 F.3d 864, 871-72
(8th Cir. 2005).
30 See id.
31 Id. at 870.
32 Id. at 869.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 See id. at 871.
36 Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1990) (citing Greenbelt
Coop. Publ'g Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970)).
37 Id. at 16.
38 Id. at 16-17.
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In contrast, the statement in Milkovich that the wrestling
coach lied under oath was "not the sort of loose, figurative, or
hyperbolic language which would negate the impression that
the writer was seriously maintaining that petitioner committed
the crime of perjury."' 9' The Court in Milkovich held that the
"connotation that petitioner committed perjury is sufficiently
factual to be susceptible of being proved true or false.""4 '
In refusing to extend First Amendment protection to all opin-
ions, the Court in Milkovich explained that even a subjective as-
sessment could imply a false assertion of fact: "Even if the
speaker states the facts upon which he bases his opinion, if those
facts are either incorrect or incomplete, or if his assessment of
them is erroneous, the statement may still imply a false assertion
of fact."4'
The Eighth Circuit contrasted the reporter's assertion in
Milkovich with the safety rating in Aviation Charter to conclude
that the safety rating was not "sufficiently factual to be suscepti-
ble of being proved true or false."42 The court found that the
interpretation of the data was "ultimately a subjective assess-
ment," "ARGUS chose which underlying data to prioritize, per-
formed a subjective review of those data, and defined 'safety'
relative to its own methodology. 41
The Eighth Circuit also cited the Seventh Circuit's holding in
Haynes v. Knopf Inc. in support of its holding in Aviation Char-
ter."4 In Haynes, a husband and wife sued an author concerning
certain statements made about them in a book.4" The language
in Haynes that the Eighth Circuit quoted in Aviation Charter
arises in the Seventh Circuit's discussion of two statements in
particular made by the wife to the author: (1) that the hus-
band's drinking was the cause of their son's mental defects; and
(2) that the husband's motives for leaving his wife were finan-
cial.4" The Seventh Circuit held that these two statements were
not actionable because the plaintiffs were required to prove spe-
cial damages, and even went on to speculate that the statements
- Id. at 21.
I d.
41 1d. at 18-19.
42 Aviation Charter, Inc. v. Aviation Research Group/US, 416 F.3d 864, 871
(8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21).
43 Id. at 870-71.
44 Id. at 871.
45 8 F.3d 1222, 1224 (7th Cir. 1993).
41 See id. at 1226.
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probably would not be actionable anyway because they were
opinions." The court noted that, while not all opinions are pro-
tected by the First Amendment, "if it is plain that the speaker is
expressing a subjective view, an interpretation, a theory, conjec-
ture, or surmise, rather than claiming to be in possession of ob-
jectively verifiable facts, the statement is not actionable."4 The
court explained that a reasonable reader would not think the
wife's statement that her husband's drinking caused her son's
mental defects was based on proof or scientific knowledge.4 9
The Eighth Circuit erroneously found that the safety rating
was incapable of being proved true or false because it misap-
plied the Supreme Court's holding in Milkovich. Because the
safety rating was not the type of communication at issue in
Milkovich-that is, a question of whether the communication is
hyperbolic in nature as opposed to an assertion of fact-the
Eighth Circuit held that the general principle laid out by the
Supreme Court in Milkovich-that something labeled "opinion"
can still imply a 'false assetion of fact-did not apply to the
safety rating in Aviation Charter.5 ° The comparison between the
challenged communications in Milkovich and Aviation Charter is
not apt because Milkovich dealt with whether the underlying as-
sertion, that the coach had perjured himself, was capable of be-
ing proved false.51 In Aviation Charter, there is no question that
the underlying facts are true-that is, that the databases on
which ARGUS relied were accurate. Rather, Aviation Charter
argued that ARGUS's assessment of that information was erro-
neous, which the Supreme Court in Milkovich strongly indicated
in dicta could be the basis for a false assertion of fact.5 2 The
Eighth Circuit did not address whether ARGUS's assessment of
the data was erroneous.
The district court in Landers illustrated the distinction be-
tween types of communications by contrasting the employee's
performance rating in Landers with the statement that an em-
47 Id. at 1226-27.
48 Id. (citing Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 17-21). This was part of the language
quoted by the Eighth Circuit in Aviation Charter in support of its holding. Avia-
tion Charter, 416 F.3d at 871.
49 Haynes, 8 F.3d at 1227.
50 Aviation Charter, 416 F.3d at 871.
51 See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 3-4.
52 Appellant's Brief and Addendum, supra note 7, at 3. Recall the language in
Milkovich stating that "[e]ven if the speaker states the facts upon which he bases
his opinion . . .if his assessment of them is erroneous, the statement may still
imply a false assertion of fact." 497 U.S. at 18-19.
AVIATION CHARTER
ployee was a troublemaker in McGrath.53 The statement that the
employee was a troublemaker was the type of hyperbolic lan-
guage the Supreme Court found lacking in Milkovich.5 4 The em-
ployee rating was a subjective assessment indicating specific facts
about the employee's performance.55
The holding in Haynes does not support the Eighth Circuit's
position. The language the court points to in Haynes is dicta
that generally states the holding in Milkovich.5 6 The Eighth Cir-
cuit does not reconcile its holding in Aviation Charter with the
Seventh Circuit's assertion in Haynes that the statement regard-
ing the husband's drinking being the cause of his son's defects
is conjecture because readers would not assume it was based on
proof or scientific knowledge.5 By inference, the safety rating
would not be mere conjecture; readers would likely assume the
rating was based on objectively verifiable data that have some
bearing on safety.58
A safety rating can be defamatory in nature if it is based on an
erroneous assessment of objectively verifiable facts. If the assess-
ment is erroneous because of flawed methodology, then it is ca-
pable of being proved true or false. ARGUS's assessment of the
data was erroneous because its methodology was seriously
flawed-a fact of which ARGUS was keenly aware since its own
expert criticized it.59
The connotation of ARGUS's rating was that Aviation Charter
was unsafe. There are objectively verifiable data that could show
this is not true. If Aviation Charter was allowed to present evi-
dence of ARGUS's flawed methodology at trial, a jury could
have concluded that ARGUS's ultimate assessment was errone-
ous. For instance, a jury could have concluded that using "inci-
dent" actions, which may have no bearing on safety, and using
databases that are not predictors of safety to calculate a safety
rating, generates a false rating. Further, ARGUS's failure to nor-
malize the data, its failure to group the carriers in a statistically
defensible way, and its failure to take into account the frequency
53 Landers v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., No. 00-2233, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22023, at *16-17 (D. Minn. Dec. 28, 2001).
54 See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21.
55 Landers, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22023, at *16-17.
56 See Aviation Charter, 416 F.3d at 871 (citing Haynes v. Kniopf, Inc., 8 F.3d
1222, 1227 (7th Cir. 1993)).
57 See Haynes, 8 F.3d at 1227.
58 See id.
59 See Appellant's Brief and Addendum, supra note 7, at 7.
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with which the less serious records occur, could all have led to
the conclusion that the ultimate, subjective assessment was unre-
liable. A jury should have been allowed to make this
determination.
Publishers of ratings and rankings provide a valuable public
service. Consumers, incapable of researching and analyzing the
data on all the goods and services they purchase, often rely on
published rankings and ratings and believe them to be reliable
assessments based on objectively verifiable data. Extending pro-
tection to the publication of any ranking or rating, no matter
how erroneous the assessment or how malicious the intent with
which it was published, leaves providers of goods or services de-
fenseless against false assertions of fact that lower them in the
estimation of their customers. Though the Eighth Circuit was
correct that the First Amendment does not protect an opinion
that implies a false assertion of fact, it erroneously concluded
that the communication in this case was not sufficiently factual
to avoid protection. In finding that ARGUS's safety rating was
not defamatory because it was incapable of being proved true or
false, the Eighth Circuit too narrowly construed the Supreme
Court's holding in Milkovich and went a long way toward ex-
tending First Amendment protection to anything labeled "opin-
ion," which the Supreme Court expressly refused to do in
Milkovich.
